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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), federal employees may bring claims
against their employer for discrimination.1 Since 1978, the
Act in its amended form has generously, yet often
interpreted as confusingly, provided two separate provisions
under which a claimant may bring a claim—section 501 and
section 504.2 Section 501 "is aimed at preventing agencies of
the federal government from discriminating against
applicants and employees with disabilities,"3 whereas
section 504 applies to programs conducted by private entities
receiving federal financial assistance in addition to programs
conducted by executive agencies.4 Both provisions, however,
intend to prohibit discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and increase the opportunities of disabled
persons within society.5 Several United States Supreme
Court cases address aspects of Rehabilitation Act claims,
such as whether section 504 provides a private right of action
for employment discrimination,6 the availability of damages
under section 504,7 or whether a condition qualifies as a
"handicap" under section 504.8 None of these cases, however,
specifically address whether section 501 or section 504 is the
more appropriate section for discrimination claims brought
by federal employees. Federal circuit courts and several
district courts, on the other hand, have varying opinions
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2020)).
2 Id.
3 1 ADA: Emp. Rights § 2.01 (2020).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that section 504 does not create a private
right of action for employment discrimination).
7 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holding that punitive
damages are not available in private suits under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act since punitive damages could not be
awarded in private suits brought under Title VI, which is the
relevant regulation of remedies for claims brought under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
8 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987),
superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as recognized in Shiring v.
Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1996).
1
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about which section is appropriate for a federal employee's
disability discrimination claim and the requirements
therein, with some declining to address the issue or allowing
a case to proceed under one provision or the other without
explanation as to why.9
A solution is therefore needed to identify a best
practice, and consequently, a more uniform system of
applying the intent of the legislature to Rehabilitation Act
claims. By identifying and memorializing such a solution,
Rehabilitation Act claimants may select the appropriate
section of the Act from the point of their initial filing, carry
out the specific requirement of that section, have greater
clarity in their expectation for relief, and aid in the
conservation of judicial resources, while honoring the
legislative intent of the Rehabilitation Act.
To find and propose the most appropriate solution to
this problem, this note will first review the background of the
Rehabilitation Act and its relationship to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). Then, it will explain the provisions in
question, including how section 501 and section 504 came
into existence, their amendments, legislative intent,
causation standards, and remedies, which will shed light on
the importance of identifying the correct provision under
which to file. Next, this note will offer an overview of the
"provision camps" formed by various interpretations
throughout the federal circuit courts. Finally, this note will
present a best practice that naturally flows from a deeper
understanding of the combined background, legislative
intent, and historical usage of each provision.

A. BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA)

TO

THE

What we know as the Rehabilitation Act today began
in 1917 with the Smith-Hughes Act. This act created the
Federal Board of Vocational Education to address vocational
rehabilitation needs of veterans with disabilities.10 Over
See infra Section III.
Smith-Hughes Nat’l Vocational Educ. Act of 1917, Pub. L. No.
64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (1917); see also The history of vocational
rehabilitation, VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION,
https://scvrd.net/history (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
9
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time, those services were expanded to civilians with
disabilities and broadened in their types of assistance and
services provided, with architectural, employment, and
transportation barriers finally being eliminated to allow for
equal access for people with disabilities by way of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11
The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, "[a]n Act to
replace the Vocational Rehabilitation Act"12 and predecessor
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),13 was
enacted to establish the Rehabilitation Services
Administration and authorize programs for the furnishing of
vocational and rehabilitative services to “handicapped
persons.”14 The Act, as passed in 1973, did not contain a
specific provision for a private right of action under section
501, and contained a more limited version of section 504.15
However, the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978 added
section 505(a)(1) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1)) and
created a private cause of action under section 501, in
addition to other important changes.16 The Senate Report for
those amendments states that the purpose of the
amendment was to provide "for individuals aggrieved on the
basis of their handicap the same rights, procedures, and
remedies provided individuals aggrieved on the basis of race,

29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2020).
Id.
13 Am. with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (2020)
(revising the Rehabilitation Act to explain that the newly added
terms “drugs” and illegal use of drugs” were to be interpreted
consistent with the principles of the Controlled Substances Act,
21 U.S.C. §801, and excluded individuals currently engaged in
illegal drug use from coverage).
14 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
15 Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
16 1 ADA: Emp. Rights § 2.01 (citing Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196
(3d Cir. 1995); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied sub. nom., Barth v. Duffy, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994) ("private
cause of action added to Rehabilitation Act because 'Congress
decided that stronger measures were needed on behalf of persons
subjected to handicap discrimination by government agencies");
see infra Section II for a detailed discussion of other important
amendments.
11
12
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creed, color, or national origin."17 The Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1992 then changed the term “handicapped
person” to “individual with a disability” and applied the
standards of Title I of the ADA to determinations of
employment discrimination under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.18 Finally, the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 aligned the meaning and interpretation of the
definition of “disability” under section 504 with the ADA.19
In regard to the protections granted under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that “the ADA must be construed to be
consistent with regulations issued to implement the
Rehabilitation Act”20 and “grant at least as much protection
as provided by the regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act.”21 In practice, “cases addressing the ADA
are generally relevant for purposes of resolving claims
brought under the Rehabilitation Act.”22 Although the two
acts have “two distinct causation standards,”23 the ADA is a
direct descendant of the Rehabilitation Act—it tracks its
concepts while updating its terminology. Thus, each act can
inform the other in a case analysis.24

B. RELEVANT PROVISIONS
REHABILITATION ACT

TO

CLAIMS UNDER

THE

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as
amended, broadly guarantees that

S. REP. NO. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 18 (1978); see also 124
CONG. REC. S15,591 (Daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of
Senator Cranston).
18 Rehabilitation Act Amends. of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106
Stat. 4344 (1992).
19 ADA Amends. Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(2008).
20 Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 US. 624, 638 (1998).
21 Id. at 632.
22 Hale v. Johnson, 245 F.Supp.3d 979, 985 (E.D. Tenn. 2017)
(citing Doe v. Salvation Army in U.S., 531 F.3d 355, 357 (6th Cir.
2008).
23 See Lewis v. Humbolt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 315 (6th
Cir. 2012).
24 See appendix to this note.
17
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[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service.25
Section 501, alternatively, prohibits employment
discrimination by federal departments and agencies,
including the U.S. Postal Service and Postal Rate
Commission, against individuals with disabilities and
requires affirmative action in the hiring, placing, and
advancing of individuals with disabilities in the federal
sector.26 "Section 501's provision for affirmative action in
addition to section 504's prohibition of discrimination
against the disabled indicates that federal employers are
charged with a greater duty to ensure the employment of
disabled workers than are federal grantees or private
employers."27 The similarity of intent paired with the
provisions' intermingling tendencies, as described above,
creates potential for confusion in an analysis of whether one
provision is more proper than the other when filing a claim.
Additionally, each provision has its own causation
standard—section 504 explicitly states a "sole" causation
standard whereas section 501 only implies a "but for"
causation standard.28 Finally, the remedies available to an
aggrieved employee differ depending on the chosen provision
as well—section 501 relies on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 whereas section 504 relies on Title VI of the same act,
and those titles have their own inherent differences to boot.29

II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND AMENDMENTS
The United States Supreme Court succinctly
explained that the basic purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2020).
29 U.S.C. § 791 (2020).
27 Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1997).
28 29 U.S.C §§ 701, 794 (2020).
29 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2020); see infra Section II.B.
25
26
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to "promote and expand employment opportunities for the
handicapped."30 The original Rehabilitation Act—The
Rehabilitation Act of 1972—contained only brief verbiage
representing what would later become section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and no verbiage of the later
enacted section 504.31 President Nixon killed the original
legislation, however, by way of pocket veto after letting it sit
on his desk until the 92nd Congress was out of session.32
When the bill was re-introduced in the House of
Representatives on January 3, 1973, still no language
correlating to the enacted section 504 existed. The "clean
bill" was then referred to the House Committee on Education
and Labor on January 29, 1973.33 Again, the "clean bill"
contained the same language described above, without any
language relating to the prohibition of discrimination toward
handicapped persons by any program receiving federal
financial assistance.34
When the measure was laid on the table on March 8,
1973, and S.7 passed in lieu, text had finally been added to
state that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in
the United States shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance."35 This took
the Rehabilitation Act from an action to provide protection
Consol. Rail Corp., 465 U.S. at 634 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 701(8)).
Rehabilitation Act of 1972: Hearings on H.R. 8395 Before the
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Pub.
Welfare, 92nd Cong. 92 (1972).
32 Rehabilitation Act of 1972 (H.R. 8395), 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1579 (Oct. 30, 1972). See also dsteffen, How regulation came
to be: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, DAILY KOS (Dec. 12, 2010),
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2010/12/12/928271/-.
33 CONG. RSCH. SERV., Summary: H.R. 3064—93rd Congress
(1973–1974), Introduced in House (01/29/1973), available at
Congress.gov (digital text of H.R. 3064 is not available).
34 The language remained the same when reported to the house
with amendments on March 2, 1973. CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
Summary: H.R. 17—93rd Congress (1973–1974), Reported to
House with amendment(s) (03/02/1973), available at Congress.gov
(the actual digital text of H.R. 17 is not available).
35 CONG. RSCH. SERV., Summary: S.7—93rd Congress (1973–
1974), Introduced in Senate (01/04/1973), available at
Congress.gov (digital text of S.7 is not available).
30

31
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for both federal employees, by way of section 501, to an action
that also provided for non-federal employees with disabilities
who participate in or seek the benefits of a program or
activity funded through the federal government. The
Committee Report accompanying S.7 provided explanation
that the bill was intended to remain "vocationally oriented,"
while still providing for "individuals whose handicap is so
severe, or because of circumstances, such as age, that they
may never achieve employment."36 Additionally, this report
recognized the need for a committee "which will initiate an
affirmative action plan for and seek to insure [sic] that there
is no discrimination in employment of handicapped
individuals by and within the agencies of the Federal
Government in hiring, placement, or advancement . . . and
that the special needs of handicapped individuals are being
met on the job,"37 which appears to be language that would
later become section 501. However, very little documentation
exists on the discussion of section 504's meaning or
importance in Senate Report accompany S.7 or even when it
was eventually enacted.38 The most detailed discussion
comes from a congressional debate through Senator
Humphrey's remarks:
I am deeply gratified at the inclusion of these
provisions which carry through the intent of
original bills which I introduced, jointly with
the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Percy), earlier
this year, S. 3044 and S. 3458, to amend,
respectively, Titles VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, to guarantee the right of
persons with a mental or physical handicap to
participate in programs receiving Federal
assistance, and to make discrimination in
employment because of these handicaps, and
in the absence of a bona fide occupational
S. REP. NO. 93-48, at 19 (1973).
Id. at 51.
38 Id. at 53 (stating only that "The bill further proclaims a policy
of nondiscrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped
individuals with respect to participation in or access to any
program which is in receipt of Federal financial assistance"); Id.
at 80 (referring to the same simple language without
explanation).
36
37
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qualification, an unlawful employment
practice. The time has come to firmly establish
the right of these Americans to dignity and
self-respect as equal and contributing
members of society, and to end the virtual
isolation of millions of children and adults
from society.39

President Nixon again vetoed the Act on March 27,
1973,40 describing it as one "which mask[s] bad legislation
beneath alluring labels."41 The President justified his
decision by explaining that although the bill might "further
an important social cause," it "neglect[ed] to warn the public
that the cumulative effect of a Congressional spending spree
would be a massive assault upon the pocket books of millions
of men and women in this country" along with other
unintended consequences.42
The Senate failed to override the veto, but after
negotiations between the Committee on Education and
Labor and the Administration, the Senate introduced S. 1875
on March 29, 1973.43 By June 27, the full Committee made
a unanimous vote to order S. 1875 to be favorably reported
to the Senate.44 President Nixon finally signed the bill
(eventually, H.R. 8070) into law on September 26, 1973,
enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.45

118 CONG. REC. 32,310 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
CONG. RSCH. SERV., Actions Overview: S.7—93rd Congress
(1973–1974), available at Congress (veto exists in S. Doc. 93-10
(03/27/1973).
41 S. Doc. No. 93-10, at 1 (1973), available at
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/messages/NixonR/S7Sdoc-93-10.pdf.
42 Id. at 1–2.
43 S. REP. NO. 93-318, at 5 (1973) (Conf. Rep.).
44 Id. at 6.
45 CONG. RSCH. SERV., Actions Overview: H.R. 8070—93rd
Congress (1973–1974), available at Congress.gov. See also DAILY
KOS (Dec. 12, 2010) (explaining the delay in passage of the bill
due to the initial failure of Congress to compromise on the
elimination of independent-living funding provisions).
39
40
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A. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AND REMEDIES
Since its 1973 enactment, the Rehabilitation Act has
been amended six times,46 but the most important
amendments to this discussion are the 1978 and 1988
amendments. Before these amendments, section 501 “merely
required federal agencies to submit affirmative action
plans,"47 and there was no explicit private right of action
under section 501 or 504, although some courts held that
there was an implied right of action.48
The 1978
amendments provided a response to this confusion by adding
a private right of action under section 501, an extension of
section 504, and remedies for both under section 505. The
same year, the then Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW)49 also promulgated regulations to implement
section 504 after the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that it was necessary to do so in Cherry v.

SIDATH V. PANANGALA AND CAROL O'SHAUGHNESSY, CONGR.
RSCH. SERV., RS22068, REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973: 109TH
CONGRESS LEGISLATION AND FY2006 BUDGET REQUEST 1–2 (2005).
47 Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 302–03
(5th Cir. 1981).
48 Smith v. United States Postal Serv., 742 F.2d 257, 259 (6th Cir.
1984) (listing a "confusing series of cases" showing an implied
right of action in some cases but not others). In Smith, the Sixth
Circuit did not discuss whether Congress intended section 501 to
be the exclusive remedy for federal employees, but it did find that
the Supreme Court's rejection of the view that section 504 did not
apply to discrimination left only the question of whether a federal
employee suing under section 504 was required to meet the same
exhaustion requirement as one suing under section 501; see also
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1096–98 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Goldberg, J. dissenting) (citing legislative history that "shows
that the 1978 Congress had no quarrel with the near-unanimous
judicial interpretation of section 504" that a private right of
action had been created by section 504); see also Prewitt, 662 F.2d
at 301.
49 HEW is now the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and the Department of Education (ED). CYNTHIA
BROUGHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973: PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES IN PROGRAMS OR
ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL ASSISTANCE, 2 (2010).
46
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Mathews,50 an impetus that was assisted by lengthy
demonstrations at the HEW offices.51
When section 504 was originally enacted in 1973
under the header, "Nondiscrimination under Federal
Grants," it simply read,
No
otherwise
qualified
handicapped
individual in the United States, as defined in
section 7 (6), shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.52
However, the 1978 amendments to section 504
extended the heading to "Nondiscrimination under Federal
grants and programs" and struck out the period at the end
thereof, inserting "or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service . . . ."53 In comments on the 1978 amendments,
Senator Cranston, one of the principal authors of section 501,
stated,
I can say with some authority that it was
enacted in large part, as a result of the belief,
on the part of Congress, that it was the
responsibility of the Federal Government to be
an "equal opportunity employer." The
legislative history of the section 501 illustrates
that with respect to the employment of

Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976) (action filed
to compel the Secretary of HEW to promulgate regulations
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
51National Council on Disability, "Rehabilitating Section 504"
(Feb. 12, 2003), available at
https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/Feb122003.
52 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87
Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
53 Amends. to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-602,
92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (1978).
50
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handicapped individuals, Congress expected
the Federal Government should be a leader.54
Additionally, in a 1976 congressional hearing,
Senator Williams stated that the reason Congress enacted
section 501 was "to require that the Federal Government
itself act as the model employer of the handicapped and take
affirmative action to hire and promote the disabled."55

B. REMEDIES AND RELIEF
In response to the disagreement among courts
regarding whether there was an implied right of action under
section 501, the 1978 amendments specifically added section
505 (a)(1) (codified as 29 USC 794a) to make Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16)
available to any complainant filing under section 501.56
These amendments additionally inserted section 505(2),
making Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 available "to
any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any
recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such
assistance under section 504 of this Act."57
In essence, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and allows for civil
actions by aggrieved employees or job applicants,58 which is
triggered by final agency or EEOC action, or failure to act

CONG. REC. S15591 (Sept. 20, 1978); see also Prewitt, 662 F.2d
at 301.
55 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 301 (citing Rehabilitation of the
Handicapped Programs 1976: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on the Handicapped of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1502 (1976), quoted in Linn,
Uncle Sam Doesn't Want you: Entering the Federal Stronghold of
Employment Discrimination Against Handicapped Individuals,
27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1978).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2020) (providing for a civil action to be
brought in the same manner as an action against a private
employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
54
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within a set time period.59 Title VII also provides the
administrative remedies process and exhaustion of those
remedies requirement.60 Title VI of that act prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin
under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance and connects to employment discrimination when
“the primary objective of the financial assistance is the
provision
of
employment
or
where
employment
discrimination causes discrimination in providing services
under such programs.”61 Title VI lays out an administrative
procedure that essentially causes the withholding of federal
funds from recipients that discriminate.62 In other words,
Title VI enforcement appears to provide “no relief to the
individual victim of discrimination."63

C. DEFINITION OF "PROGRAM OR ACTIVITY"
By 1984, the terms "program" and "activity" (as in
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance" seen in section 504) had not been defined by any
amendments. However, based on the Supreme Court's
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2020) (giving aggrieved persons the
right to bring suit if the EEOC does not sue, after failing to secure
voluntary compliance, but otherwise gives them only the right to
intervene in the EEOC suit); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)
(2020) (requiring suit to be brought within 90 days of notice of
final agency or EEOC action and permitting suit after a lapse of
180 days without final agency action).
60 42 USC § 2000e-5 (2020).
61 Title VI & VII, Office of Institutional Equity & Diversity,
BROWN UNIVERSITY,
https://www.brown.edu/about/administration/institutionaldiversity/oversight/discrimination-and-harassment/title-vi-vii.
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 (2020).
63 James Lockhart, Annotation, To What Extent are Federal
Entities Subject to Suit Under § 504(a) of Rehabilitation Act (29
U.S.C.A.§ 794(a)), Which Prohibits any Program or Activity
Conducted by any Executive Agency or the Postal Service from
Discriminating on Basis of Disability, 146 A.L.R. Fed. 319, *2
(2020).
(citing e.g., Mercadel v. Runyon, 6 A.D.D. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Tuck v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., 7 F.3d 465, (6th
Cir. 1993), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied (Nov. 19,
1993)).
59
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"narrow interpretation" of the phrase "program or activity"
in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Public Law
100-259 encouraged the addition of subsection (b) to section
504 in 1988.64 Importantly, this amendment clarified the
term "program or activity" and "program" to mean:
all of the operations of–
(1)(A) a department, agency, special
purpose, district, or other instrumentality of a
State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local
government that distributes such assistance
and each such department or agency (and each
other State or local government entity) to
which the assistance is extended, in the case
of assistance to a State or local government;
(2)(A) a college, university, or other
postsecondary institution, or public system of
higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency (as
defined in section 198(a)(10) of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965), system
of vocational education, or other school
system;
(3)(A)
an
entire
corporation,
partnership, or other private organization, or
an entire sole proprietorship–
(i) if assistance is extended to
such corporation, partnership, private
organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole;
or
(ii) which is principally engaged
in the business of providing education, health
care, housing, social services, or parks and
recreation; or
(B) the entire plant or other
comparable, geographically separate facility to
which Federal financial assistance is
extended, in the case of any other corporation,
BROUGHER, supra note 49, at 3 (citing Grove City College v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) and Consol. Rail Corp., 465 U.S. 624
(1984).
64
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partnership, private organization, or sole
proprietorship; or
(4) any other entity which is
established by two or more of the entities
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) . . . . 65

Section 501, as first passed in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, has experienced less change compared to section
504. Although the original wording in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1972 did not contain the wording meant to establish the
Interagency Committee on Handicapped Employees with the
"purpose and function" to "provide a focus for Federal and
other employment of handicapped individuals" as the
current section 501 provides, the general focus of the words
that eventually developed into section 501 were always
centered on a Federal purpose, with no mention of "State or
local governments," either in 1972 or today,66 as the 1988
amendment to section 504 provided.

III. THE PROVISION CAMPS
Regardless of whether the claimant brings a claim
under section 501 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (or
both), the claimant must show that (s)he was “otherwise
qualified” for the position.67 However, the burden of proof
differs depending on the chosen provision. Section 501
requires only that the employee prove (s)he was
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102
Stat. 28 (emphasis added).
66 Compare Rehabilitation Act of 1972: Hearings on H.R. 8395
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong. 2, 92 (1972) with Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2020)).
67 29 U.S.C. §794 (2020) (covering “[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with a disability . . .” in its protections); 29 U.S.C. §
791 (2020) (referencing Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.,
which defines “qualified individual” and prohibits any covered
entity from discriminating against one). See Belasco v.
Warrensville Heights City Sch. Dist., 634 F. App’x 507, 517 (6th
Cir. 2015) (including “otherwise qualified” in the elements for a
disability discrimination claim); Lai Ming Chui v. Donahoe, 580
F. App’x 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2014) (including “otherwise qualified”
in the elements of a failure to accommodate claim).
65
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discriminated against because of her or his disability.68
Section 504, on the other hand, requires the claimant to show
that her or his disability was the sole reason for the
discrimination.69 When courts stray from utilizing the
section that appropriately applies to the cause-of-action-athand, the standard the court relies upon may also be called
into question.70
The circuits are divided on whether section 501 and
section 504 overlap with each other, allowing federal
employees to sue under either or both, and whether one or
the other should be the exclusive remedy.71 However, it is
important to determine which section governs a federal
employee’s cause of action because the chosen section
determines the level of burden for proving elements of the
claimant's prima facie case.72 By narrowing the focus to cases
dealing with federal employee claims against a federal
employer and separating the courts into "camps" based on
the provision under which they allowed the claimant to bring
her or his claim, followed by the application of legislative
intent to the provisions, greater clarity may be had for
determining the correct approach in situations that have
been previously muddled or simply unaddressed.

29 U.S.C. § 791 (2020). See Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists
P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven if an employee
establishes that their employer “regarded” them as disabled . . .
the employee must still show that their employer discharged
them (or took some other form of adverse employment action
against them) because of, or “but-for,” their actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment”) (citing Lewis v. Humboldt
Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
69 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2020); Stanciel v. Donahoe, 570 F. App’x 578,
581 (6th Cir. 2014) (“An employer makes a termination decision
solely because of its employee’s disability when the employer has
no reason left to rely on to justify its decision other than the
employee’s disability.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
70 See infra Section IV.
71 Lockhart, supra note 63.
72 Id.
68
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A. COURTS ALLOWING FEDERAL EMPLOYEE CLAIMS
UNDER SECTION 504
When the list of what defines a program or activity
covered under section 504 is boiled down, section 504 covers
three major classes of recipients of federal funds: (1) public
school systems; (2) colleges and other institutions of higher
learning; and (3) health, welfare and social service
providers.73 Although this list does not explicitly include
federal employees, some circuits have still recognized a
private right of action for federal employees under section
504, which is likely a confusion caused by the 1978
amendments that added the words "or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service" to section 504.74
In Taub v. Frank, for example, the First Circuit
allowed a postal worker's claim to proceed under section 504,
although it determined that Taub was ultimately not covered
because he was not discharged "solely by reason of" his
disability, drug addiction, but rather for distributing drugs,
which is criminal and cannot be accommodated regardless of
this fact.75 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit allowed an FBI
agent's claim under both section 501 and 504 for an
alcoholism disability, but focused on whether the claimant
was "otherwise qualified"—a testament to section 504, and
the regulations implementing section 504 that qualify an
alcoholic or drug addict as a "handicapped individual"—
1 ADA: Emp. Rights § 2.01 (2020).
See supra Section II.
75 Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Roy v.
Runyon, 954 F. Supp. 368 (D. Me. 1997) (entertaining a section
504 suit without ruling on the issue of whether suit under this
section is proper, leading district courts to conclude that suit
under section 504 is proper, and assuming that the stricter "sole
causation" provision applied whether the cause of action was
under section 501 or section 504); Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748
(1st Cir. 1995) (deciding the case under 504 standards even
though suit was brough under section 501, and noting that in
Taub v. Frank, the appellate court had permitted suit under
section 504); Sedor v. Frank, 42 F.3d 741 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting
that section 504 applied to federal executive agencies and the
Postal Service, but not specifically considering whether suit under
section 504 or section 501 is more proper).
73
74

RECONCILING REHABILITATION ACT

127

rather than investigating which section was proper for the
claim.76 Ultimately, the court decided that Little failed to
state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act in general.77
Prewitt v. United States Postal Service is also a crucial
case to this discussion, as it was the first case in a federal
circuit since the 1978 amendments applied to the Act.78 The
Fifth Circuit, having no comparison on how the 1978
amendments applied in context, investigated the legislative
history, and made the finding that
[B]y
its
1978
amendments
to
the
Rehabilitation
Act,
Congress
clearly
recognized both in section 501 and in section
504 that individuals now have a private cause
of action to obtain relief for handicap
discrimination on the part of the federal
government
and
its
agencies.
The
amendments to section 504 were simply the
House's answer to the same problem that the
Senate saw fit to resolve by strengthening
section 501. The joint House-Senate
conference committee could have chosen to
eliminate the partial overlap between the two
provisions, but instead the conference
committee, and subsequently Congress as a
whole, chose to pass both provisions, despite
the overlap. "When there are two acts upon the
same subject, the rule is to give effect to both
if possible." By this same principle, in order to
give effect to both the House and the Senate
1978 amendments finally enacted, we must
read the exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement of section 501 into the
private remedy recognized by both section 501

Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1993); see also
Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Because of the less
than artful manner in which Congress amended the
Rehabilitation Act, the statutory provisions produce an
apparently incongruent enforcement scheme.").
77 Id. at 259.
78 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 292.
76
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and section 504 for federal government
handicap discrimination.79

Like the Taub, Little, and Prewitt courts, the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits also allowed claims by federal employees
under section 501 or section 504. In Hall v. United States
Postal Service, the Sixth Circuit referenced the Smith cases
from 1984 and 1985 to hold that
While it has not always been so, it is now clear,
at least in this circuit, that federal employees,
including Postal Service employees, alleging
handicap discrimination in employment may
maintain private causes of action against their
employers under both sections 501 and
sections 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.80
That court viewed Hall's allegations of violations of
section 504 of the Act and of the administrative regulations,
which were adopted under section 501, to be a complaint
applicable to both sections.81
Finally, in Morgan v. United States Postal Service, the
Eighth Circuit allowed a section 504 claim to be filed by a
federal employee but insisted on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, comparing the case that was before
that court to other cases where exhaustion was not required
when the defendant was not the federal government.82 The
Id. at 304 (citing United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939)). But see Johnston, 875 F.2d 1415 (disagreeing with the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation and holding that section 504 does
not create a private cause of action against a federal employer by
a federal employee).
80 Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1077 (6th
Cir. 1988) (relying on Smith v. United States Postal Serv., 766
F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Smith, 742 F.2d at
259–60.
81 Id.
82 Morgan v. United States Postal Serv., 798 F.2d 1162, 1165 (8th
Cir. 1986); see also Oliver v. United States Army, 758 F. Supp.
484 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (holding that the Army and Air Force
Exchange Services is a federal employer because they were listed
in EEOC regulations, making administrative remedies available
79
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Eighth Circuit simply stated, "The difference appears to lie
with the identity of the defendant."83 Although Morgan was
decided several years before Johnston, the Eighth Circuit
was starting to touch on important aspects of the
amendments that provided explicit private rights of action
and the reasons why section 501 and section 504 do not
necessarily "overlap," as the Prewitt court had decided.
Although it was only decided at the district court
level, the court in Mackay v. U.S. Postal Service also provided
an important opinion surrounding the remedies pertaining
to section 501 and section 504 claims.84 The Eastern District
of Pennsylvania noted that section 504 does not expressly
require exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the
express provisions of 505(a)(2) entitle a section 504 claimant
to the remedies of Title VI, which also does not require
exhaustion of administrative remedies.85 The critical issue,
in that case, was whether in a suit brought under section
504, the private cause of action against the federal
government is provided under section 505(a)(1) or 505(a)(2).
This must be clarified, because if a section 504 claim was
subject to 505(a)(1), which incorporates Title VII, or if a
federal employee discrimination claim could only be brought
under section 501, exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be a prerequisite to court action.86 The district court
found that although section 504 prohibits handicap
discrimination by executive agencies or the Postal Services,
section 505(a)(2) only furnishes a remedy to persons
to them, yet expressly allowing suit under section 504 with
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement); Cf.
Johnston, 875 F.2d 1415 (explicitly holding that federal
employees do not have a cause of action under section 504, but
adding that even if the appellate court were to allow a section 504
claim, it would read into it the same Title VII procedural
requirements that applied under section 501).
83 Id. (referencing Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act:
Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
867, 873 & n.48 (1984) (explaining that "plaintiffs suing the
federal government may need to exhaust, whereas those suing a
federally funded party need not exhaust")).
84 See Mackay v. United States Postal Serv., 607 F. Supp. 271
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
85 Id. at 274.
86 Id.
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aggrieved by the actions of a recipient of federal assistance
or a federal provider of such assistance and does not
specifically refer to a federal entity such as the Postal
Service, which is neither a recipient nor a provider of federal
assistance.87 Furthermore, that court noted that the
omission of postal employees in relation to a Title VI remedy
is "consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown,
where the Court held the district court had no jurisdiction
over a federal employee's discrimination claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 because Title VII provides the exclusive
remedy for claims of discrimination in federal
employment."88 Ultimately, the district court found that the
differences between section 505(a)(1), which supplies Title
VII remedies, and section 505(a)(2), which supplies Title VI
remedies to a limited group not specifically including Postal
Service employees, demonstrates that Postal Service
employees as well as other federal employees must use the
"exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme of
Title VII to remedy public job-related handicap
discrimination."89
This selection of cases shows that when courts were
faced with needing to interpret sections 501 and 504 and
their requisite remedies as they apply to federal employees,
Title VII remedies seemed to be a more logical solution. This
conclusion therefore points to section 501 as the more
appropriate provision for federal employee discrimination
claims.

B. COURTS DISALLOWING CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 504
Courts that disallowed a claim under section 504
seem to have generally done so when the defendant was not
considered a federal entity, a receiver of federal funds, or
when it did not fit the definition of "program or activity." In
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried,
for example, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected
the argument that a television station's license should be
denied on the ground that it had not complied with section
Id.
Id. (citing Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S.
820, 832–33 (1976)).
89 Id. (citing Brown, 425 U.S. at 829).
87
88
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504 and found that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) was not required to comply with section
504 in its licensing activities.90 The Court found that section
504 was not intended to impose new enforcement obligations
on the FCC, which was not a funding agency, and stated that,
absent some specific direction in the Rehabilitation Act, the
Court was unwilling to conclude that a public television
station owed a duty to comply with section 504 and that the
FCC had a duty to evaluate a public television station's
service to the handicapped community by a stricter standard
than that applicable to commercial stations in determining
whether to renew a public station's license.91
The Southern District of New York in DePompo v.
West Point Military Academy, like the court in Mackay, held
that since section 505(a)(2) made section 504 enforceable
through Title VI remedies, which were intended to police
federally funded programs, it presumably was intended to
reach the federal government only as a direct provider of
services or a funder of other providers.92 Another district
court, the Eastern District of Virginia, held that an
insurance company was not a recipient of federal financial
assistance, and therefore, was not subject to suit under
section 504.93 Additionally, in Williams v. Meese, the Tenth
Circuit held that a federal prison inmate, who claimed he
had been denied certain prison job assignments based on his
handicap, failed to state a claim under section 504 of the

Cmty. Televisions of S. Cal. v. Gotfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983); see
also Cal. Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 840 F.
2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 848 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding that commercial broadcasters who did not receive
federal financial assistance were not subject to section 504 and
this conclusion was unaffected by the 1978 amendment extending
the reach of 504 by adding the clause "any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency," as this phrase referred to
the FCC"s own activities and not those of the entities licensed or
certified by the FCC).
91 Id.
92 DiPompo v. W. Point Military Acad., 708 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
93 Dodd v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, 835 F. Supp. 888
(E.D. Va. 1993).
90
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Rehabilitation Act, since the Bureau of Prisons did not fit the
definition of "program or activity" governed by section 504.94
These cases show that section 504 is not appropriate
for entities not directly receiving federal funds, and more
importantly, that courts faced with these claims did not
consider section 501 as an option. These outcomes further
highlight section 501's exclusivity for federal employees
alone.

C. COURTS ALLOWING CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 501
ONLY
Some courts have recognized a private right of action
for federal employee disability discrimination claims under
section 501 only, discounting section 504 as an option. In
McGuinness v. United States Postal Service, for example, the
Seventh Circuit held that the claimant failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and the outcome of his case would
have been the same even if he filed under section 504 because
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required either
way.95 That court noted that "it would make no sense for
Congress to provide (and in the very same section–505(a))
different sets of remedies, having different exhaustion
requirements, for the same wrong committed by the same
employer; and there is no indication that Congress wanted to
do this—as of course it could do regardless of what might
seem sensible to us—when it added section 505 in 1978."96
The court in Johnston v. Horne, held that "no private
cause of action exists for a federal employee against a federal
employer under § 794."97 That case dealt with the accusation
of a forced medical retirement from a shipyard claimant
filing under both sections 501 and 504. The Ninth Circuit
explained that section 504 does not create a private cause of
action against a federal employer by a federal employee,
while acknowledging the circuit split of opinions and stating,
Williams v. Meese, 926 F. 2d 994 (10th Cir. 1993) (failing to
consider whether the Bureau of Prisons was separately subject to
Section 504 as an executive agency).
95 See McGuinness v. United States Postal Serv., 744 F.2d 1318
(7th Cir. 1984).
96 Id. at 1321.
97 Johnston, 875 F.2d at 1418 (utilizing the codified version (§
794) of the Rehabilitation Act's section 504).
94
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"It is unlikely that Congress, having specifically addressed
employment of the handicapped by federal agencies (as
distinct from employment by recipients, themselves
nonfederal, or federal money) in section 501, would have
done so again a few sections later in section 504."98 The D.C.
Circuit also "strongly" suggested that federal employees
proceed with discrimination claims under section 501, rather
than section 504, recognizing that the statutes are
duplicative and some courts have limited claims against the
government as the employer to actions brought under section
501, while others have allowed litigants to proceed under
either provision.99
These opinions plainly and decisively provide logical
explanations of the 1978 amendments and how those
amendments apply to federal employee claims while
respecting the legislative intent of sections 501 and 504.

D. COURTS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRING EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SECTION 504 SUITS
In Smith v. United States Postal Service, the claimant
attempted to argue that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies
because section 504 actions are to be governed by Title VI
rather than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an
argument “based upon imaginative reading of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago.”100 He
argued that “since the Supreme Court recognized in Cannon
Id. at 1420 (quoting Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752
F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1985); McGuiness, 744 F.2d at 1321). See
also Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989) (agreeing with the
Ninth Circuit that "section 501 is the exclusive remedy for
discrimination in employment discrimination on the basis of
handicap and that section 501, not section 504, provides for a
private cause of action for federal employees).
99 Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom., Barth v. Duffy, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994); see also Milbert v.
Koop, 265 U.S. App. D.C. 206 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (collecting cases
describing the split and showing cases that expressly found suit is
proper only under section 501).
100 Smith, 742 F.2d at 260 (referencing Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
98
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the kinship between Titles IX and VI held that a private
right of action could be maintained in advance of exhaustion
under the former by analogy to the latter, and since Title VI
is closely tied to Section 504 through Section 505(a)(2) of the
Rehabilitation Act, it follows that exhaustion is not required
under Section 504.”101 The Sixth Circuit rejected this
argument stating,
[T]here are significant differences between
this employment discrimination action
brought by a Postal Service employee against
his federal employer under a statute which
provides him with extensive administrative
procedures to remedy the alleged wrong, and
the situation in Cannon, which involved a sex
discrimination action brought by a rejected
applicant to a private medical school under a
statute which provided no such recourse.102
The Sixth Circuit went on in Smith to investigate the
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and its 1978
amendments, applying the principal set forth in Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), that explained, “in
determining whether exhaustion is required, court[s] should
first examine legislative intent.”103 When examining the
legislative intent of the 1978 amendments, the Sixth Circuit
highlighted that
In amending the statute to incorporate
expressly the "remedies, procedures, and
rights" set forth in Title VII to redress
handicap discrimination by federal agency
employers, it is evident that Congress
intended to invoke the legal principles applied
in Title VII actions based on allegations of
race, sex and national origin discrimination in
employment, including the requirement that a

Id.
Id.
103 Id. at 261.
101
102
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claimant exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit in federal court.104
Additionally, “[t]he exhaustion requirement is part of
a longstanding congressional policy favoring resolution of
claims
of
employment
discrimination
through
administrative conciliation rather than a formal adversary
process whenever possible.”105
To further make its point, the Sixth Circuit relied on
the Supreme Court case of Smith v. Robinson, where the
claimant, a child with cerebral palsy, brought claims under
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. §1983.106 In that case,
the Supreme Court held exhaustion of administrative
remedies under the EHA, which was established to clarify
and enforce the educational rights of handicapped children,
should not be circumvented by utilizing the “more general
antidiscrimination provisions of Section 504.”107 Thus, the
Sixth Circuit similarly held that the 1978 amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act require exhaustion of administrative
remedies whether the claim is brought under section 501 or
section 504 because “Congress has not enacted one set of
principles excusing exhaustion in handicap cases and
another set of principles requiring exhaustion in sex, race,
national origin, and age discrimination cases.”108
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have also allowed
federal employee discrimination claims under both sections
but maintain that the Title VII exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement exists for both. In addition to Hall v.
U.S. Postal Service, where the Sixth Circuit stated that
federal employees may maintain a private cause of action
against their employers under either section, but must
exhaust administrative remedies,109 the Eleventh Circuit
Id. (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982) (Title VII
exhaustion requirement).
105 Id. (citing e.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d
394 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1976).
106 Id. (relying on Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)).
107 Id. at 262.
108 Id.
109 Hall, 857 F.2d 1073; see also Smith, 742 F.2d at 262;
Nighswander v. Henderson, 172 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955–56 (N.D.
Ohio 2001).
104
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considered a “handicap” discrimination claim by an employee
of the Army Corps of Engineers under both section 501 and
section 504. The Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to
discuss whether such a claim was actionable under only one
or the other,110 and held that whether the action is brought
under section 501 or 504, the employee must satisfy the Title
VII exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.111
Again, these types of holdings, which allow a claim by
a federal employee under section 504, yet still require the
exhaustion of administrative remedies, points to section 501,
which clearly requires exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as the appropriate provision for federal employee
claims.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF APPLYING THE APPROPRIATE
CAUSATION STANDARD
The standards of causation differ depending on the
selected section for filing a federal employee disability
discrimination claim—section 501 only requires a "but for"
causation standard while section 504 requires a "sole"
causation standard.112 Historically, courts have confused
these standards, sometimes relying on the “sole” causation
standard when the statute only required the “but-for”
standard.113 The Sixth Circuit made the existence of this
error evident in Lewis when it stated:

Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that the 1978 amendments of the Rehabilitation Act
extended the proscription of section 504 to activities of the federal
government and created a private right of action under section
501 in favor of persons subjected to “handicap” discrimination by
federal employing agencies).
111 Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that,
like other circuits who have adopted this interpretation of
Rehabilitation Act amendments, it was necessary to recognize
that section 504 affords a private right of action to federal
employees while imposing the section 501 and Title VII
exhaustion requirement on federal employees bringing suit under
section 504 in order to accommodate Congress’s intent).
112 See supra Section IV.
113 Lewis, 681 F.3d at 314.
110
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For the past seventeen years, our court has
required district courts to instruct juries that
ADA claimants may win only if they show that
their disability was the “sole” reason for any
adverse employment action against them. The
term crept into our ADA jurisprudence in
Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d
843 (6th Cir. 1995), which involved claims
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, a happenstance that may explain why
we blurred the distinction between the laws in
the first place . . . Our interpretation of the
ADA not only is out of sync with the other
circuits, but it also is wrong. Since Maddox,
Congress has amended the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA several times, but the distinction
between the causation standards used by the
two laws persists.114
The Sixth Circuit's discussion was focused on the
importance of not importing the “sole” causation standard
from section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to an ADA-only
claim. However, it also spoke to the importance of not
intermingling the “sole” causation standard of section 504
with the “but-for” standard of section 501, especially given
that section 501 has never been amended to include the
words “solely by reason of” and because it directly references
Title I of the ADA.
For claims filed under section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act, courts have also held that a claimant
must show that her or his disability was a “motivating” or
“substantial factor” in the employer’s adverse action to meet
the “but-for” or “because of” standard.115 Under section 504,
on the other hand, a claimant must show that her or his
disability was the sole reason for the employer’s adverse
action.116 To explain the complexities involved in these
Id. at 313–15.
Id. at 317.
116 Id. (“Courts must refrain from ‘apply[ing] rules applicable
under one statute to a different statute without careful and
critical examination,’ . . . an examination that in this instance
reveals distinct causation tests.” (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)).
114
115
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standards, the Lewis court pointed to Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, where the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the
“because of” standard within “mixed-motive cases.”117 The
Court decided that “if a Title VII plaintiff shows that
discrimination was a ‘motivating’ or a ‘substantial’ factor in
the employer’s action, the burden of persuasion should shift
to the employer to show that it would have taken the same
action regardless of that impermissible consideration.”118
However, the Court in Gross refused to extend the
“motivating factor” rationale (taken from Title VII
amendments that were added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991)
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which
“does not allow a plaintiff to prove discrimination merely by
showing that her disability was a motivating factor behind
her adverse employment action; the ADEA requires
discrimination to be because of a disability, which means
“but-for” causation.”119 The Lewis court held that Gross
resolved its case, explaining, “No matter the shared goals
and methods of two laws, it explains that we should not apply
the substantive causation standards of one antidiscrimination statute to other anti-discrimination statutes
when Congress uses distinct language to describe the two
standards.”120 This reasoning can be used to resolve
discrepancies in causation standards under the
Rehabilitation Act in the same manner.
Therefore, logic dictates that in order to apply the
correct substantive causation standard of section 501 claims
and section 504 claims, it is necessary to utilize the
appropriate provision for the claimants as indicated by both
statutory direction and legislative intent.

V. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES EXISTS ONLY UNDER SECTION 501
The caselaw above, paired with the legislative history
of the Rehabilitation Act, and courts' interpretations of that
legislative history points to the result that a private right of
Lewis, 681 F.3d at 317 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989)).
118 Id. (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 171).
119 Id. at 318 (citing Gross, 577 U.S. at 174, 177–78).
120 Id. at 318–19.
117
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action for federal employees bringing claims against federal
employers exits only under section 501.

A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY POINTS TO SECTION 501 AS
THE EXCLUSIVE PROVISION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
First, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act,
albeit scarce, provides justification for federal employees to
exclusively rely on section 501 for claims against their
federal employers. In Senator Humphrey's remarks
pertaining to S.7, for example, the "virtual isolation of
millions of children and adults from society," which he
mentions in regard to the rights of handicapped persons'
participation in programs receiving federal assistance,121 is
unlikely to refer simply to federal employees, but rather
refers to the general members of society that have been
impacted by discrimination within these programs. This
remark shows that the addition of section 504 was not meant
as another means for federal employee protection from
federal employers, but rather for others (i.e., private citizens)
in addition to the protections that already existed in section
501 for federal employees.
Furthermore, the 1984 amendments defining
"program or activity" contain the specific adjectives "State"
and "local" placed before the word "government" throughout
the new section, and there is no mention of the "federal"
government therein. This emphasis of "State and local
government," coupled with the mention of private
organizations at subsection (3) in defining what section 504
intended to cover, contrasts section 501's emphasis on the
federal government. The Ninth Circuit was inclined to agree
with this interpretation in Vinieratos v. U.S. Department of
Air Force Through Aldridge.122 Although it did not
specifically discuss section 504, the Ninth Circuit held that
Title VII (the remedy provided in relation to section 501) is
the exclusive channel for federal employee disability-based
118 CONG. REC. 32,310 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
Vinieratos v. United States Dep’t. of Air Force ex. rel. Aldridge,
939 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII is the
exclusive channel for federal employee disability employmentbased discrimination claims to be heard in federal court, and
failure to exhaust Title VII administrative remedies forecloses
any claim to jurisdiction under the Rehabilitation Act).
121
122
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discrimination claims to be heard in federal court, and
failure to exhaust Title VII administrative remedies
forecloses any claim to jurisdiction under the Rehabilitation
Act.123
Perhaps the most telling sign that section 501 was
intended for federal employees while section 504 was
intended for others is the method in which section 501 is
enforced. In 1979, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) took over responsibility for section 501
and was charged with "coordinating and enforcing all the
equal employment opportunity programs throughout the
federal government."124 The laws under EEOC’s authority
are numerous and include sections 501 and 505 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which makes discrimination against a
qualified person with a disability in the federal government
unlawful, and Title I of the ADA, which protects the rights of
employees and job seekers against discrimination.125
However, the EEOC does not enforce sections 503, 504, or
508 of the Rehabilitation Act, which pertain to federal
contractors, programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance, and the accessibility of electronic
information used by the government for people with
disabilities, respectively.126 The EEOC also does not enforce
Title II of the ADA, which relates to the public programs,
services, and activities that protect people with
disabilities.127 Thus, in charging the EEOC with the
authority to enforce federal laws prohibiting discrimination
in the workforce, it is clear that the charge was not intended
for implementation of sections not specifically intended for
federal employees bringing claims against federal employers.
Moreover, the Department of Labor (DOL) clearly
differentiates between sections 501 and 504 by listing section
501 as a prohibition of "federal agencies from discriminating
against qualified individuals with disabilities in employment
Id.
1 ADA: Emp. Rights at 3.
125 Laws Enforced by EEOC, EEOC.GOV,
https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/laws-enforced-eeoc (last visited
July 10, 2020).
126 Workplace Laws Not Enforced by the EEOC, EEOC.GOV,
https://www.eeoc.gov/workplace-laws-not-enforced-eeoc (last
visited July 10, 2020).
127 Id.
123
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[and] . . . take[s] affirmative action in hiring, placing and
advancing individuals with disabilities," while listing section
504 as a prohibition against "recipients of federal financial
assistance from discriminating against qualified individuals
with disabilities in employment and in their programs and
activities."128 The DOL points out that it has a Civil Rights
Center (CRC) to enforce section 504 as it relates to recipients
of financial assistance,129 while pointing to the EEOC for
requirements under section 501.130 Even more importantly,
the DOL openly states, "Individuals do not have to exhaust
administrative procedures under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. They may file suit in federal district court
against a private employer receiving federal financial
assistance, without filing a complaint with the
administrative agency."131
Similarly, the National Council on Disability (NCD),
the "independent federal agency charged with advising the
President, Congress, and other federal agencies regarding
policies, programs, practices, and procedures that affect
people with disabilities"132 stated, "Section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act is acknowledged as the first national civil
rights law to view the exclusion and segregation of people
with disabilities as discrimination and to declare that the
Federal Government would take a central role in reversing
and eliminating discrimination."133 This statement points to
the federal government's role in protecting disabled citizens,
but does not point to federal employees when mentioning the
DEP'T. OF LABOR, LAWS AND REGULATIONS, available at
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/disability/laws (last visited Nov.
21, 2020).
129 Id.; DEP'T. OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT, available at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oasam/centers-offices/civil-rightscenter/about (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
130 Id.
131 DEP'T. OF LABOR, OFFICE OF DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT POLICY,
available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/odep/publications/factsheets/employment-rights-who-has-them-and-who-enforces-them
(last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
132 National Council on Disability, "About Us," available at
https://www.ncd.gov/about.
133 National Council on Disability, "Rehabilitating Section 504"
(Feb. 12, 2003), available at
https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/Feb122003.
128
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purpose of section 504, but rather to "people with
disabilities" in general. With clear charges, such as those to
the EEOC, and logical interpretations paired with overt
public statements like those from the DOL and NCD, it is
difficult to see how these sections could have ever become so
intwined.

B. CASELAW POINTS TO SECTION 501 AS THE
EXCLUSIVE PROVISION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
While some caselaw does not offer a thorough
investigation of whether section 501 or section 504 is
appropriate for a federal employee's disability discrimination
claim, case law from courts that addressed the issue of
whether a claimant appropriately brought a claim under
section 501 or section 504 tends to point to the conclusion
that federal employees should only bring their claim under
section 501.
For example, the Taub court was not required to
address the question in detail since Taub was not discharged
for a reason covered by the Rehabilitation Act at all.134 The
Little court simply allowed the claimant to file under both
sections while largely focusing on section 504 as a convenient
way to discuss how Little may not have been "otherwise
qualified" for his position.135 The Hall and Smith courts
made similar holdings based on vague interpretations of the
sections and allowed claims by federal employees under
both.136 The Morgan court allowed a claim under section 504,
yet still required the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
a requirement of section 501, not section 504, since the
defendant was the federal government.137 The Prewitt court,
Taub, 957 F.2d. at 8.
Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1993); see also
Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Because of the less
than artful manner in which Congress amended the
Rehabilitation Act, the statutory provisions produce an
apparently incongruent enforcement scheme.").
136 Hall, 857 F.2d at 1077; Smith, 766 F.2d at 206; Smith, 742
F.2d at 259–60.
137 Morgan, 798 F.2d at 1165 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Oliver, 758
F. Supp. 484 (holding that the Army and Air Force Exchange
Services is a federal employer because they were listed in EEOC
134
135
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however, did delve into a legislative history discussion,
coming to the conclusion that section 501 and section 504
overlap each other and justified applying the exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement to both sections,138
only to be disagreed with by the Tenth Circuit a few years
later in Johnston, which stated that section 504 does not
create a private cause of action against a federal employer by
a federal employee.139
Although not binding, several district court cases
helped to shed light on the specific requirements of section
501 and section 504, differentiating the separate purposes of
the two sections. The Mackay court explained that section
504, which specifically relies on section 505(a)(2) and Title
VI for its remedies, and does not include the exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement, should be treated
separately from section 501, which specifically relies on
section 505(a)(1) and Title VII for its remedies (which does
require the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement).140 That court also relied on the Supreme Court
decision from Brown to hold that Title VII is the exclusive
remedy for federal employees.141 Likewise, the DiPompo142
and Dodd143 courts made similar differentiations between
the two sections. Hence, claims by federal employees under
the Rehabilitation Act should be filed under section 501.
Courts that disallowed claims under section 504 also
help to clarify why section 501 should be reserved for federal
employees and section 504 for other entities receiving federal
funds. For example, in finding that the FCC was not required

regulations, making administrative remedies available to them,
yet expressly allowing suit under section 504 with exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement); Cf. Johnston, 875 F.2d
1415 (explicitly holding that federal employees do not have a
cause of action under section 504, but adding that even if the
appellate court were to allow a section 504 claim, it would read
into it the same Title VII procedural requirements that applied
under section 501).
138 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 304.
139 Johnston, 875 F.2d 1415.
140 Mackay, 607 F. Supp. 271.
141 Id. (citing Brown, 425 U.S at 832–33).
142 DiPompo, 708 F. Supp. 540.
143 Dodd, 835 F. Supp. 888.
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to comply with section 504 in its licensing activities,144 the
Supreme Court certainly did not suggest that claimants rely
on section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act instead. These types
of decisions further highlight the relation of section 501
specifically to federal employees.
Nonetheless, court decisions that explicitly allowed
claims under section 501 offer the most useful clarification of
section 501's purpose as compared to that of section 504. The
Seventh Circuit came to the logical conclusion that it would
be insensible for Congress to provide two different sets of
remedies with different requirements within the same
section for the same wrong committed by the same
employer,145 which seems to be a more believable
interpretation than the one provided in Prewitt, which
tolerated the idea that Congress actively made a decision to
pass overlapping provisions.146 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the Seventh Circuit's logic, addressing the unlikeliness
of two closely-located sections of the same act addressing the
same types of employment in regard to handicapped
individuals.147 Finally, the D.C. Circuit followed suit by
recommending section 501 as the proper provision for federal
employment discrimination claims.148 Additionally, even
when courts allowed suit by federal employees under section
504, the majority required the exhaustion of administrative
remedies,149 which speaks to the appropriateness of section
501 instead of section 504 for these claims.

VI. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL FOR BEST PRACTICE
Federal employees, such as employees of the Postal
Service or legislative and judicial branches of the
government, should file under section 501 of the
Cmty. Televisions of S. Cal., 459 U.S. 498.
McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 1318.
146 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 304.
147 Johnston, 875 F.2d at 1418.
148 Barth, 2 F.2d 1180.
149 Smith, 742 F.2d at 260 (distinguishing that case from Cannon,
441 U.S. 677, a sex discrimination action) (relying on Smith, 468
U.S. 992 (explaining that Section 504 should not be used to
circumvent the exhaustion requirements under Section 501); see
also Hall, 857 F.2d 1073; Nighswander, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 955–
56; Treadwell, 707 F.2d 473; Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455.
144
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Rehabilitation Act when seeking redress for disability
discrimination by their federal employer. The trends above
show that even if a federal employee brings action under
section 504, the courts are likely to hold that exhaustion of
administrative
remedies
is
required,
nonetheless.
Additionally, section 504 technically does not allow for
damages personal to the claimant, but rather seeks to
withhold funding from the entity receiving federal funding
as recourse for their discriminatory actions.150 Therefore, it
may not financially benefit the claimant to bring her or his
claim under section 504.
Employees of private entities that receive federal
financial assistance, such as public-school systems, colleges
and other institutions of higher learning, and health,
welfare, and social service providers, should conversely rely
on section 504. The legislative intent of section 504 and the
amendments that followed speak to the intention of Congress
to allow for federal employees and non-federal employee
individuals alike to be protected by disability discrimination,
but under two separate sections of the Rehabilitation Act.
Section 501 shows that the federal government is the leader
in this effort and opens the door to section 504 to hold all
entities receiving federal funds, not just the federal
government itself, to a higher standard of inclusion for
disabled individuals.
Finally, applying a uniform standard of how
claimants may file under the Rehabilitation Act based on
their status as a federal employee allows for the appropriate
causation standard to apply to the claimant’s case, making
for a less convoluted analysis by the court and ultimately
saving personal and judicial resources.

However, most circuit and district courts have concluded that
compensatory damages, such as pain and suffering, are available
under section 504, mostly based on their reading of Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, where the Court held that
compensatory damages were available to a student who brought a
claim of sexual harassment against a teacher under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972. 1 ADA: Employee Rights §
2.01.
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APPENDIX

Provisions
Rehab. Act, § 501 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 791) - prohibits
discrimination of disabled federal employees by Federal
government

Rehab. Act, § 504 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794) - prohibits
discrimination of an otherwise qualified individual by
recipients of federal finanical assistance who discriminate
in their programs and activities

Violation Standards
ADA, Title I (prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities)

Remedies
Rehab Act, § 505(a)(1) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794a(1))

Rehab Act, § 505(a)(2) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2))

Procedural References
Civil Rights Act, Title VII (requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies)

Civil Rights Act, Title VI (aimed at withholding federal
funds)

Causation Standards
"but-for"/"because of"

"soley by reason of"

A

